



# **GUIDE TO CYBER SECURITY FOR DIRECTORS OF IRISH COMPANIES**



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. TARGET GROUP OF THIS GUIDE .....	4
2. WHY IS THIS GUIDE IMPORTANT FOR YOU? .....	6
3. THE GOAL IS CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE OF YOUR ORGANISATION .....	8
4. WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD YOU BE ASKING AS A DIRECTOR? .....	10
5. PRIORITISE TO EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE YOUR CYBER RISKS .....	12
6. CONTINUOUS OVERSIGHT – GOVERNANCE .....	16
7. LEGAL ASPECTS OF YOUR MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY .....	20
8. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER EXTENDS BEYOND YOUR OWN ORGANISATION .....	22
9. EXTERNAL REPORTING OBLIGATIONS .....	24
10. DIRECTOR TRAINING WITH IMPACT .....	26
11. KEEP YOUR FINGER ON THE PULSE AND IMPROVE WHERE NECESSARY .....	28
12. SET THE RIGHT TONE AT THE TOP – LEAD BY EXAMPLE .....	30
13. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	32
APPENDICES .....	34
APPENDIX 1: .....	34
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY .....	34
APPENDIX 2: .....	35
NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF CYBER RISKS .....	35
APPENDIX 3: .....	36
CHECKLIST FOR DIRECTORS .....	36
APPENDIX 4: .....	37
SPECIFIC NATIONAL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS .....	37
Read more about DORA .....	40
DORA – Responsibilities of Directors .....	40
DORA – Liabilities of Directors .....	40
Read more about CER .....	42
Read more about CRA .....	42



# 1. TARGET GROUP OF THIS GUIDE

This document is intended as a general guide for the board of directors of Irish companies in relation to obligations under EU cybersecurity laws, including the Second Network and Information Systems Directive ("**NIS2**"), the Digital Operational Resilience Act ("**DORA**") and the Cyber Resilience Act (the "**CRA**").





## 2. WHY IS THIS GUIDE IMPORTANT FOR YOU?

Our society, economy and national security are heavily dependent on information and communication technology (ICT). Increasingly, machines in production lines and businesses' logistical infrastructure are also connected to the internet. We are vulnerable if something goes wrong, and many organisations are not well prepared for a 'no-ICT' situation. In times of geopolitical tension, organisations are more vulnerable to digital disruption. Cyber security is no longer just an ICT issue – it is a strategic priority for directors.

From an Irish legal perspective, directors have a range of duties and obligations under statute and common law, which require directors to act in good faith in what the director considers to be in the best interests of the company, and to act honestly and reasonably in relation to the conduct of affairs of the company. This includes ensuring that their organisation has effective risk management and control systems in place. Directors may be held personally liable for breach of these duties under Irish law, including potential restriction and disqualification as directors, or civil or criminal liability in certain circumstances.

As cyber security risks consistently rank among the top three risks facing any organisation, it is essential that directors have sufficient cyber expertise, and that cyber risks are fully integrated into regular risk management and control systems. Cyber security risks are a strategic risk. It is not sufficient to delegate responsibility to the Company's IT department or information security officer, or to restrict involvement to annual budget approvals.

The European legislators have set out specific duties for directors of financial institutions and critical infrastructure providers in DORA<sup>1</sup> and NIS2<sup>2</sup>. The impact of these obligations is far-reaching. They require organisations to take adequate measures to manage cyber security risks, establish that it is the directors' duty to approve these measures and supervise their implementation, stating that directors can also be held liable in that regard. They also set requirements for directors' training, knowledge and expertise.

---

*Cyber threats are usually external in nature. They come from adversaries – such as cyber criminals or hostile states – intending and able to cause harm to your organisation (or a supplier).*

---

These requirements are not only relevant to organisations directly subject to the new legislation. Given the growing cyber threat, directors of all organisations are required to take responsibility. In short, managing cyber risks is an integral part of your role as a director. This guide aims to assist you.

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554>

<sup>2</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555>






### 3. THE GOAL IS CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE OF YOUR ORGANISATION

Regulatory compliance is important for any organisation. Failure to comply with regulation can jeopardise business operations, including the ability to offer products and services in the marketplace and the ability of directors to continuously occupy their roles. However, compliance is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end – namely, ensuring the success and continuity of your organisation's business processes and protecting the data of customers or the public. Further, compliance allows organisations to demonstrate their investments in security, building trust with both customers and regulators. Where cyber security risks are critical to achieving your strategy, it should be a priority to address these risks at the board level. Your organisation cannot function if its ICT does not work properly, and the same applies to your supply chain.


In most cases, your organisation's ICT is not a support function but a primary business process. Although this may seem obvious, it needs mentioning. For example, online banking is a primary business process and largely consists of an ICT platform. If this platform is damaged or disrupted, the primary process is no longer viable. The same applies to manufacturing companies where, for example, machines are remotely controlled and monitored. In the case of ICT product and service providers, there are multi-dimensional security and resilience responsibilities. Such organisations must implement security and other risk-management measures for their offerings to customers in addition to managing risks and instituting safeguards for their enterprise activities. Managing cyber risks and improving cyber resilience (for instance, through proper data backups and contingency facilities) must be part of your strategic objectives and activities as a director.

Figure 1: Cyber risk as a combination of factors



Cyber risks are business risks. Concepts such as risk mitigation, risk appetite and residual risk are not new. Risk is a combination of 'impact' and 'likelihood'. Cyber risks may arise from human error (for example, where software settings are not properly configured) or from ICT failures in the supply chain. Unlike most business risks, however, cyber risks are largely shaped by intentional threats from external actors. For this reason, we use a model that includes a third factor: the cyber threat.

Figure 2: Risk reduction through effective risk mitigation measures



Impact relates to your business assets and the potential consequences for your organisation's operations. This could include service disruption, theft of intellectual property or confidential information, personal data breaches, harm to individuals or reputational damage. These are the potential consequences in relation to the three factors of ICT security: ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.

Cyber threats are usually external in nature. They come from adversaries – such as cyber criminals or hostile states –intending and able to cause harm to your organisation or a supplier

The last factor is vulnerability. This is the factor you can influence by applying risk mitigation measures – referred to in specialist jargon as 'controls' – to your ICT systems. ICT systems include servers, databases, operational technology (OT), and network and cloud infrastructure. Examples of controls include the use of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for login processes, the management of privileged access rights, and continuity measures in case of failure, such as reliable data backups and contingency.

When risk mitigation measures are properly aligned with the cyber threat, the impact on your business assets should remain within your risk appetite.



## 4. WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD YOU BE ASKING AS A DIRECTOR?

Start by asking yourself and your co-directors the following: How much risk are we willing to take? What is our risk appetite? How much disruption to our organisation is acceptable? How damaging would it be if our know-how or intellectual property were lost to a competitor through corporate espionage? How serious would it be if a cyber incident put us on the front pages?

What are the consequences of a personal data breach? What budget are we willing to allocate for handling cyber incidents? How do we deal with cyber extortion (ransomware)? The appendix includes a non-exhaustive list of risks that may be recognisable for your organization.

---

*Consider the strength of your organisation's security culture. Can employees raise their concerns? Are roles and responsibilities for managing cyber risks clearly assigned?*

---

As a Director, you should also ask your Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) specific questions, these could include:

- Do we clearly document roles and responsibilities, including direct and indirect reporting, for cybersecurity functions?
- What are our ICT systems, and do we have an up-to-date inventory? How much undocumented ICT (shadow ICT) do we have?
- What are the main threats to our organisation, and why? Consider threat actors, their tactics and methods, as well as the risk of unintentional disruption.
- Do we have legacy systems that are no longer supported by the supplier? Do we have a phasing-out plan, and how are we mitigating the risk in the meantime?
- How important is the cyber security of our products and services to our customers, or even to society at large?
- What are our key controls, and what is their current status?
- What are the consequences of missing or ineffective controls? How will we improve them?
- Are our key ICT systems tested for security and resilience (red teaming)?
- Do we have an incident response and recovery plan? Do we test it?
- Do we have a plan B in case our ICT fails? What contingency options are in place?
- How large is our residual risk? Does it fall within our risk appetite?
- Are there cybersecurity functions, tooling, or other matters that are misaligned with the organization's risk appetite or risk management framework? If so, what resources are needed for remediation?
- Are we aware of our key dependencies on ICT suppliers? How do we manage the risks that come with that dependency?

- What do we do to identify, evaluate, monitor, and mitigate risk from third parties?
- Do we have contractual terms to manage third-party risk?
- Do we also have active risk-management programs for third parties in addition to protective contractual programs? What do such programs involve, and how effective are they?
- Are the resources we allocate to cyber security sufficient and effective?
- Which systems are so critical that we strictly limit access, or even allow access only at physical locations?
- As a company and as Directors, are we adequately insured against cyber risks?
- Under what circumstances would we consider complying with extortion demands?
- How well trained is our personnel in cyber security?
- How does our cyber security compare to others in our sector?
- Have we implemented security-by-design and security-by-default principles in the development and delivery of our digital products and services? How do we ensure that cyber security is integrated throughout the entire product lifecycle, from design to deployment and maintenance?
- What tools and indicators exist to measure adherence to secure software development requirements? And what do they show?
- What cyber security risks do our products and services pose to our customers and end-users? Do we have processes in place to identify, assess and mitigate vulnerabilities in our products before they reach the market, and how do we respond to security issues discovered after deployment?
- For the ICT product and services offered to customers, have they been developed according to secure software development principles?
- What measures are used to ensure the security of ICT services or products that are acquired for use in the organization or for integration with our products and services?
- What measures exist to manage cybersecurity risk from any merger or acquisition of corporate entities? Or from divesting or selling part of the organization?
- What measures exist to ensure use of appropriate cryptography and other technical controls to ensure security?

You should receive regular (quarterly) reports with the answers to these questions, along with context on major cyber incidents inside and outside the organisation, emerging threats and regulatory developments. At the same time, the CISO should highlight any developments that significantly alter the risk landscape – for better or worse – and propose relevant actions and resources.



## 5. PRIORITISE TO EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE YOUR CYBER RISKS

As a Director, you are expected to approve your organisation's cyber risk strategy and oversee its implementation. Zero risk is impossible, and resources are limited. Fortunately, it is possible to prioritise aspects of cyber risk and maintain strategic oversight without needing to know every detail.

Irish companies can seek guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) at [www.ncsc.gov.ie](http://www.ncsc.gov.ie) for threat intelligence, incident response support, and best practice guidance.

Frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27001<sup>3</sup>, NIST CSF<sup>4</sup>, and COBIT<sup>5</sup>, and Cyber Fundamentals<sup>6</sup> are useful tools for managing cyber security risks. They comprehensively outline the organisational measures and processes your organisation can implement to ensure cyber security and resilience. It does not matter which framework your organisation chooses, provided that only one framework is used internally, in alignment between the CIO, CISO, and risk and audit functions.

A word of caution: frameworks primarily focus on ensuring processes are in place (for example, whether there exists a contingency process) but do not themselves guarantee that the risks are sufficiently mitigated. In other words, frameworks do not assess the effectiveness of controls. They furthermore typically include processes for accepting deviations from prescribed controls. While this meets the process requirement; it does not equate to actual risk mitigation. Certification under a framework provides only a limited degree of assurance.

Frameworks include hundreds of controls to cover all aspects of security risk management. Not all controls are equally important. Experience shows that a very limited subset of key controls covers the most significant security risks. Measuring the proper functioning and effectiveness of these key controls enables your organisation to set up a strategic dashboard with Key Control Indicators (KCIs), allowing you to exercise well-informed oversight.

<sup>3</sup><https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html>

<sup>4</sup><https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework>

<sup>5</sup><https://www.isaca.org/resources/cobit>

<sup>6</sup>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374061802\\_Ten\\_Key\\_Insights\\_for\\_Informed\\_Cyber\\_Oversight](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374061802_Ten_Key_Insights_for_Informed_Cyber_Oversight)

Below is a list of KCIs drawn up by a working group of CISOs from major multinationals. It can serve as a starting point for determining KCIs in your own organization<sup>7</sup>. The first KCI on the list is by far the most important: establishing an 'Inventory of ICT assets'. After all, an organisation cannot protect what it doesn't know exists. Most of the other KCIs relate directly to the ICT systems in the inventory. For example, the KCIs that cover making backups or installing security updates apply only to ICT systems that are accounted for in the inventory. The effectiveness of these KCIs diminishes if that inventory is incomplete.

Table 1: Examples of Key Control Indicators

	Description	Measurement
KCI 1	Inventory of ICT assets	% of critical ICT assets included in inventory, in accordance with policy
KCI 2	Privileged accounts	% of privileged accounts managed within policy; number of privileged accounts
KCI 3	Addressing vulnerabilities	% of high-risk security updates applied within N hours
KCI 4	Reliable backups of data and applications	Maximum time to recover critical resources (% of critical resources recoverable in N hours)
KCI 5	Secured workstations	% of workstations configured in line with policy
KCI 6	Log collection	% of critical systems onboarded for log collection
KCI 7	Network security	% of compliant network security settings
KCI 8	Third-party compliance	% of compliant key connections with third parties
KCI 9	Identity management	% of systems and users covered by multi-factor authentication (MFA) – % of privileged accounts using phishing-resistant MFA
KCI 10	Major incidents	% of major cyber incidents with no business impact
KCI 11	Risk acceptance	Number of risk accepted policy deviations
KCI 12	Security of internet-exposed ICT systems	% of internet-exposed assets that are adequately protected and monitored
KCI 13	Crown jewels monitoring	% kroonjuwelen gedekt door beveiligingsmonitoring
KCI 14	Origin of cyber incidents	% of security incidents linked to deficiencies in at least one key control
KCI 15	Resilience testing	Results of resilience testing (red teaming)
KCI 16	Cryptography	% of resources with post-quantum security % of resources with compliant key management

<sup>7</sup> [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374061802\\_Ten\\_Key\\_Insights\\_for\\_Informed\\_Cyber\\_Oversight](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374061802_Ten_Key_Insights_for_Informed_Cyber_Oversight)



KCIs reflect your organisation's priorities. The way you select and report on them will shape its direction. These choices are thus crucial and require thorough discussion and decisions at board level.

In industrial environments, do not overlook the situation around operational technology and process automation (OT). OT often involves outdated software that is no longer maintained, and security updates for control software are difficult to install during production. In such cases, alternative protective measures (such as isolation) must be taken. These measures require separate reporting.

Also be cautious when using averages as they can conceal serious risks. For example, if a KCI calculates the percentage of resolved cyber incidents based on all cyber incident types (low, medium and high risk), it might report that 95% were resolved without business impact. However, a single high-risk incident with serious consequences could go unnoticed.

Finally, your organisation needs to be prepared for extreme scenarios (no ICT, loss of a supplier, etc.). It is recommended that you test your organisation's resilience and robustness regularly by holding table-top exercises and conducting external cyber resilience tests such as TLPT (Threat Level Penetration Testing) and TIBER (Threat Intelligence- based Ethical Red Teaming).









## 6. CONTINUOUS OVERSIGHT – GOVERNANCE


Established practices exist for reporting and assigning responsibilities around traditional business risks. However, for managing cyber security risks, such practices are often still lacking. For example, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of cyber security programmes and to obtain reasonable assurance that residual risk remains within the organisation's risk appetite. As a result, cyber risk reports to Directors vary widely. They often focus on progress in implementing processes, measuring effort rather than effectiveness.



The figure above illustrates an ideal situation for cyber governance – the organisation of decision-making, monitoring, reporting, and oversight of cyber security risk management. The starting point is the appointment of a CISO (or similar officer). The CISO holds a central role in cyber governance and is responsible for developing and implementing measures to control cyber security risks. The CISO works closely with the internal operational services (business, ICT and OT operations, innovation) as well as risk management and audit functions.



In the upper part of the figure, you see that the CISO coordinates cyber risk mitigation measures with the board, especially regarding risk appetite, business priorities, and budget. The board receives regular updates from the CISO on the status of KCIs, the threat landscape, significant incidents and regulatory developments.



In the lower part of the figure, you see that the CISO implements the board's strategy through cyber controls, working together with the internal operational services. The CISO monitors the effectiveness of cyber controls, responds to deviations and incidents, and makes any necessary adjustments. Many activities take place in the lower pyramid, i.e. 'under the hood' for the board.

As a Director, you must ensure your CISO has the skills, resources and autonomy to develop and implement the organisation's cyber security policy and to support you in exercising duty informed oversight. In doing so, you should ensure that your internal processes, responsibilities and reporting lines are clearly documented in your governance framework.

---

*It is important that the CISO is supported by a clear mandate, the authority to act decisively and active cooperation from all business units.*

---

Encourage coordination between the CISO's reporting and the reports from risk management and audit. Also request regular reporting, not only in the event of an incident. Ensure that reporting does not focus solely on progress in process implementation, measuring effort rather than effectiveness. Ideally, the CISO should report in person to the management board each quarter, and additionally whenever necessary. Give the CISO sufficient 'airtime'.

To meet its corporate governance obligations, the board of Directors of an Irish company can delegate specific functions to a committee of the board, comprised wholly or partly of board members, to leverage specialist knowledge and insights from both Directors and other experts within the company or wider group, ensuring informed decision making and helping to meet its obligations from a cybersecurity perspective. Board committees can make decisions within the remit of their delegated authority or provide recommendations to the board, who can choose to accept or reject the advice as appropriate. The board should regularly review the number, qualifications, and responsibilities of committee members to ensure they align with the board committee's objectives.





## 7. LEGAL ASPECTS OF YOUR MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY

Directors are subject to a range of statutory and common law duties under Irish law as part of their role in managing the business of an Irish company. These include ensuring that the organisation has effective risk management and control systems in place.

At EU level, the responsibilities of Directors of financial institutions and critical infrastructure have been tightened under new directives and regulations – including NIS2<sup>8</sup>, CER<sup>9</sup>, and DORA<sup>10</sup>. These instruments require in-scope entities to take measures to manage cyber security risks and specify that it is the responsibility of Directors to approve those measures and supervise their implementation, and in certain circumstances stating that Directors can also be held liable in that regard. They also set requirements for Directors' training, knowledge and expertise in certain instances.

The impact of the new statutory provisions is far-reaching. In most organisations, the new statutory obligations require a review of existing risk management and control systems – including those across the supply chain – and a clearer specification of cyber governance: roles, responsibilities, authorities and reporting lines.

If your organisation sells products with a digital component (hardware, software, IoT devices or apps used to operate such products), these will also have to meet strict cyber security requirements under the CRA<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>8</sup><https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555>.

<sup>9</sup>[https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/protection/critical-infrastructure-resilience-eu-level\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/protection/critical-infrastructure-resilience-eu-level_en)

<sup>10</sup><https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2554>

<sup>11</sup>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202402847](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402847)

### Directors' responsibilities under NIS2 and DORA

Both NIS2 and DORA require in-scope entities to have proper cyber risk management in place. They also specify the minimum risk control measures that must be implemented.

Directors have a duty to:

- Approve the cyber risk-management measures;
- Oversee the implementation of these measures;
- Acquire sufficient knowledge and skills through training to be able to identify cyber risks, assess the effectiveness and impact of cyber risk management and evaluate cyber risk reporting.

### Directors' liability under NIS2 and DORA

NIS2 contains certain provisions under which individuals in the organisation may be held personally liable.

Under DORA, critical ICT third-party service providers are subject to the Oversight Framework set out in Chapter V Section II<sup>12</sup> and the Oversight Framework does not contain provisions imposing personal liability on Directors or management bodies of critical ICT third-party service providers. Similarly, the CRA does not contain provisions imposing personal liability on Directors or management bodies of companies that manufacture or distribute products with digital elements.

However, both DORA and the CRA provide for material penalties, including administrative fines, on the relevant entity, and Directors could potentially be found liable for a breach of their fiduciary duties under Irish law for failing to comply with such cybersecurity laws.

The ultimate responsibility for managing and overseeing cyber risks cannot be delegated to specialist executives or a board committee. Responsibility lies with the board as a whole (collective responsibility). Individual Directors may be held jointly and severally liable for the board's collective responsibilities, even if certain tasks have been delegated to specific members of the management body or a committee of the board.

As the lead competent authority, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is responsible for the implementation of NIS2. Responsibility for the enforcement of DORA rests on the Central Bank of Ireland. However, ICT third-party service providers designed as "critical ICT third-party service providers" are subject to the Oversight Framework set out in Chapter V Section II of DORA.<sup>13</sup>

If a legal entity commits a breach, the person who ordered the act could potentially be subject to corrective measures, such as temporary suspension. Personal liability may also under NIS2 arise if gross negligence is found following a cybersecurity incident<sup>14</sup>, and management can be mandated to publicly disclose instances of, and the identity of the legal person(s) responsible for, non-compliance..

<sup>12</sup> The final assessment and designation of critical ICT third-party service providers is ongoing and will be complete by the end of 2025.

<sup>13</sup> The final assessment and designation of critical ICT third-party service providers is ongoing and will be complete by the end of 2025.

<sup>14</sup> The General Scheme of National Cyber Security Bill 2024 (the "Scheme") does not clearly establish the standard required to hold the management body members personally liable, apart from references to "gross negligence" and "willful neglect", or set out the consequences for such personal liability. The Irish transposing legislation is expected to provide the relevant detail.





## 8. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER EXTENDS BEYOND YOUR OWN ORGANISATION

Your organisation is part of a supply chain. The cyber security of your ICT depends on that of your suppliers. In turn, your customers depend on the cyber security of your products and services. Your cyber risk management is therefore not limited to your own organisation.

Extend your oversight to your supply chain, prioritising suppliers or service providers that are critical to your organisation and mitigate their cyber risks. They may also be targets for cybercriminals, which could cause your organisation to become an unintended victim. It is advisable to assess suppliers based on technical dependency (replaceability) and undesirable geopolitical dependencies. However, avoid excessive control requirements if suppliers or service providers are not critical to your organisation and processes.

The European legislation has included the security of cyber risks in your direct suppliers and service providers as part of the duty of care under NIS2 and DORA. The underlying strategic rationale of this legislation is that 'large' organisations support 'small' ones in managing their cyber risks.

---

*Ensure that the design, configuration and use of your own digital products are secure (security-by-design and security-by-default), preferably supported by certification.*

---

If your organisation sells products with a digital component (such as hardware, software, IoT products or apps used to operate products), extend your oversight to cover these products and reduce the cyber risk for your customers by ensuring that the design, configuration and use are secure (security-by-design and security-by-default). When exercising oversight, also consider any potential social impact that an incident in your organisation might cause.

The European legislation has included the security of cyber risk in your own products with a digital component as part of the duty of care under the CRA. This will help strengthen the digital resilience of both businesses and consumers.




## 9. EXTERNAL REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Your organisation also has external cybersecurity reporting obligations, including to:

- Supervisory authorities responsible for the legislation applicable to your organisation;
- Auditors auditing your financial statements, shareholders and the financial market;
- Customers;
- Insurers.

The building blocks of these external reporting obligations are similar to those of the internal framework applied by your organisation. To bridge the gap between your internal framework and those used by your external stakeholders, 'mappings' are available, such as the CRI Profile.<sup>15</sup> When applying a mapping, you must ensure that your organisation provides sufficient context in the external reporting and coherently reports the elements that the external party expects.

<sup>15</sup> <https://cyberriskinstitute.org/>







## 10. DIRECTOR TRAINING WITH IMPACT

Practice shows that training of Directors can have a significant impact on an organisation. The training must then go beyond delivering theoretical content. Directors and members of board committees do not need to become technical experts. The purpose of the training is not to turn you into a 'CISO-light', but to enable you to engage in an informed strategic discussion and to exercise effective oversight.


Key topics to be addressed include:

- Relevant elements of cyber regulation, both within the EU and beyond;
- The role and responsibility of Directors;
- The value and limitations of frameworks;
- How best to set up an international cyber risk management programme that allows efforts to be leveraged elsewhere;
- Good cyber governance (role of CISO, who reports what to whom and how often?);
- What is our risk appetite?
- What are the key controls and how do we measure them?
- Gap analysis between current cyber risk management and the desired situation;
- Establishing a continuous improvement process (*Plan-Do-Check-Act*).

Once these strategic elements have been properly addressed, the board will be in position to act and implement the necessary changes to governance and reporting to enable you to have oversight.

Some practical tips for organising cyber training for Directors:

- Deliver the training in person, at the office, as a scheduled agenda item during a regular board meeting;
- In many cases, current cyber governance and reporting to Directors will not yet meet the ideal situation. Use the preparation phase to discuss and resolve any internal friction or disagreements between departments;
- Tailor the content of the training to your organisation, your infrastructure, your sector and your existing governance and reporting structures;
- Allow sufficient time (2–3 hours) to hold a meaningful discussion on risk appetite, key controls, reporting processes and governance;
- Use the training as a continuous improvement tool for your organisation.









## 11. KEEP YOUR FINGER ON THE PULSE AND IMPROVE WHERE NECESSARY

Don't assume that cyber risks are static. Your organisation, your infrastructure and the threat landscape are constantly evolving. Technological developments such as AI, quantum computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) introduce new risks and require prompt adjustment of your security strategy.

It is therefore important to ensure that your processes and security measures are periodically reviewed and adapted to all developments to ensure that the risks remain within your risk appetite. Cyber risk management should be part of a continuous improvement process. The aim is to ensure business continuity for your business and that of the entire supply chain..

Figure 3: Continuous improvement







## 12. SET THE RIGHT TONE AT THE TOP – LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Be aware that you are a potential target of cybercriminals. You have access to valuable business assets. Cyber security should therefore be second nature to you, such as strictly separating work and private use of laptops and mobile phones, applying MFA and using an application to manage your passwords. While this is necessary to reduce the risk you may pose to your organisation, your attitude will also positively influence how your employees behave. Good cyber security starts at the top.





## 13. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This guide is based on the Dutch Cyber Security Council's Guide to cybersecurity for Directors and business owners.<sup>16</sup>

Front page picture: credit <https://gmilo.com/en>

<sup>16</sup> [Guide to cyber security for directors and business owners | Cyber Security Council](#)





# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

<b>CISO</b>	Chief Information Security Officer or equivalent officer
<b>CIO</b>	Chief Information Officer
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology. In this guide, ICT is used in the broadest sense to refer to all forms of information technology.
<b>OT</b>	Operational Technology
<b>IoT</b>	Internet of Things
<b>NIS2</b>	Network and Information Security Directive (EU)
<b>CER</b>	Critical Entities Resilience Directive (EU)
<b>DORA</b>	Digital Operational Resilience Act (EU)
<b>CRA</b>	Cyber Resilience Act (EU)
<b>Control</b>	Risk mitigation measure
<b>KCI</b>	Key Control Indicator
<b>MFA</b>	Multi-factor authentication, requires multiple verification factors to log in

## APPENDIX 2: NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF CYBER RISKS

- √ Disruption of continuity in business processes, such as goods production, administration, access to buildings, logistics, external communication, or website availability.
- √ Unauthorised access to personal data (privacy) of employees, customers, the general public, patients, etc..
- √ Extortion following a ransomware attack or threats to publicly release confidential data.
- √ Direct financial loss due to deception of employees with access to funds, misuse of financial processes or forgery in the invoicing chain.
- √ Reputational damage and loss of trust from customers or the public due to a cyber attack becoming public knowledge.
- √ Reputational damage due to unauthorised takeover of official communication channels.
- √ Reputational damage and product liability issues caused by compromised products or services.
- √ Strategic harm caused by the loss of confidential data to geopolitical adversaries, business secrets to competitors or confidential legal or financial information
- √ Accidents involving injury or material damage due to compromised products or services in sectors such as healthcare or transport.
- √ Financial loss due to the cost of incident response and repair of infrastructure.
- √ Financial consequences from the legal impact of an incident, such as disputes with customers, regulators or insurers.



APPENDIX 3:  
CHECKLIST FOR DIRECTORS

- ✓ Organise an all-hands training session for Directors to enable informed decision-making and oversight of implementing cyber risk management. Ask your CISO to map the threat landscape for your organisation.
- ✓ Determine your risk appetite
- ✓ Ask for a cyber risk strategy and a set of measures to manage cyber security risks to be drawn up, submitted and then formally approved.
- ✓ Ask for the top KCIs to be proposed, with targets set, measured and reported on a quarterly basis. Organise and test the incident response and recovery plan.
- ✓ Adapt your cyber governance to include clear mandates and reporting lines for setting, monitoring and reporting on the cyber risk strategy. Ensure the CISO has sufficient resources, autonomy and support.
- ✓ Ask for the relevant regulatory requirements for your organisation to be identified and a plan drawn up to ensure compliance.
- ✓ Determine which individuals or roles could be held liable under applicable regulation and arrange appropriate liability insurance.
- ✓ Check whether you have asked your CISO all relevant questions.

APPENDIX 4:  
SPECIFIC NATIONAL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

Read more about NIS2 – National Cyber Security Bill 2024

The NIS2 Directive applies to entities in sectors already covered by the original NIS Directive, as well as entities in newly added sectors. Organisations that fall within the scope of the Directive are classified based on its specific criteria as either an 'essential' or an 'important' entity.

As a European directive, NIS2 must be transposed into Irish law before it takes effect. On 30 August 2024, the Irish Government published a General Scheme of National Cyber Security Bill 2024 (the "Scheme"), which when enacted will implement NIS2 into law. However, the Irish transposing legislation itself has not yet been published and the final text may be different to the Scheme.

This guide will be updated, as necessary, once the Irish transposing legislation has been enacted. This is not expected until early-mid 2026.

General Scheme of the National Cyber Security Bill 2024 – Responsibilities of Directors

- Under Head 28 (Governance) of the Scheme, the management board of in-scope entities must:
- Approve the cyber security risk-management measures taken by the entity in order to comply with Head 29 (cyber-security risk management measures).
  - Oversee the implementation of Head 29 (cyber-security risk management measures) by those entities.
  - Be held liable for infringements as set out under Part 8 of the Scheme.

Head 28 also provides that the management board of essential and important entities are required to follow cyber security risk-management training and obligated to encourage their employees to take relevant cyber security training on a regular basis, in order that they gain sufficient knowledge and skills to enable them to identify risks and assess cybersecurity risk-management practices and their impact on the services provided by the entity

Head 29 (Cyber Security Risk-Management Measures) of the Schemes states that in-scope entities 'shall take appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures to manage risks to the security of the network and information systems which those entities use for their operations or for the provision of their services'. Such entities must also implement these measures to "prevent or minimise the impact of incidents on recipients of their services and on other services.'

Head 29 specifies that the measures must be based on an "all-hazards" approach and must include at least the following:

- policies on risk analysis and information system security;
- incident handling;
- business continuity, such as backup management and disaster recovery, and crisis management;
- supply chain security, including security-related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its direct suppliers or service providers;
- security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure;
- policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk-management measures;
- basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training;
- policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption;
- human resources security, access control policies and asset management; and
- the use of multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions, secured voice, video and text communications and secured emergency communication systems within the entity, where appropriate.

### General Scheme of the National Cyber Security Bill 2024 – Liabilities of Directors

The Scheme outlines three types of personal liability for individuals in organisations that fall within the scope of NIS2.

**Temporary Suspension:** The National Cyber Security Centre may make an application to the Irish High Court for a declaration that any natural person who is responsible for discharging managerial responsibilities at CEO level or who is a Director shall not act in any way, directly or indirectly, as the CEO, Director or secretary of the entity, or exercise any managerial functions unless and until the Court is satisfied that the entity meets the requirements set out in a compliance notice.<sup>17</sup>

**Criminal Liability:** If a body corporate commits an offence with the "consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any wilful neglect" of any person being a Director, manager, secretary or other officer of the body corporate, or a person purporting to act in such capacity, then such individual may be subject to the same personal criminal liability as the body corporate.<sup>18</sup>

**Public Disclosure:** Management can be mandated to publicly disclose instances of non-compliance and the identity of the legal person(s) responsible.<sup>19</sup>

**Collective liability.** Management bodies can be held liable for the entity's failure to implement measures to manage cyber security risks. 'Management body' is not defined in the NIS2 Directive but is defined in the Scheme (noting that the final text of the Irish transposing legislation may be different). Head 2 of the Scheme defines management body as '*a body of group of individuals vested with the authority and responsibility for the oversight, direction and control of an entity*'.

Liability is attributed to the 'management bodies' as a whole, which implies collective responsibility. This means that individual members can be held jointly and severally liable for responsibilities within the management board as a whole, even if certain duties have been delegated to specific members of the management body.

**Individual liability.** Any natural person who is responsible for discharging managerial responsibilities as a chief executive officer of a regulated entity can also be held liable for failing to meet their obligations to ensure NIS2 compliance.

Individual liability is therefore not limited to Directors. The provision also applies to individuals below the highest management level (i.e. employees, such as a CISO), provided that the individual concerned has been assigned the relevant managerial responsibilities and powers. This could, for example, potentially apply to a CISO who is authorised to make decisions relevant to NIS2 compliance, such as taking the network offline in the event of a security incident or reporting such an incident to the competent authority.

The Scheme does not clearly establish the standard required to hold the management body members personally liable, apart from references to "gross negligence" and "wilful neglect", or set out the consequences for such personal liability. The Irish transposing legislation may include additional details on this.

### General Scheme of the National Cyber Security Bill 2024 – Training requirements

Head 28 of the Scheme provides that the management board of essential and important entities are required to follow cyber security risk-management training and shall encourage their employees to take relevant cyber security training on a regular basis, in order that they gain sufficient knowledge and skills to enable them to identify risks and assess cybersecurity risk-management practices and their impact on the services provided by the entity.

The Irish transposing legislation may set out more specific requirements in respect of the training obligations for Directors under NIS2.

<sup>17</sup>The Scheme, Head 37B.

<sup>18</sup>The Scheme, Head 43.

<sup>19</sup>The Scheme, Head 28.

Read more about DORA

The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) is aimed at enhancing the digital resilience of the financial sector. DORA includes a regulation<sup>20</sup> and an amending directive<sup>21</sup>. The regulation, which applies directly in the Irish legal system, entered into force on 17 January 2025. However, implementation of enforcement arrangements were required.

On 11 February 2025, the European Union (Digital Operational Resilience) (No. 2) Regulations 2025 (S.I. No. 20 of 2025) (the “**Regulations**”) were signed by the Minister for Finance for the purpose of giving further effect to DORA in Ireland.

The Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) has been designated as the competent authority in Ireland for financial institutions (other than institutions for occupational retirement provision who are supervised by the Pensions Authority). ICT third-party service providers designed as “critical ICT third-party service providers” are subject to the Oversight Framework set out in Chapter V Section II of DORA.<sup>22</sup>

The three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) have been jointly appointed to lead the development of technical standards for DORA, some of which have already been published. The ESAs shall appoint a “Lead Overseer”<sup>23</sup> for each critical ICT third-party service provider.<sup>24</sup>

The primary focus of the Oversight Framework is to ensure the provider implements comprehensive, sound and effective rules, procedures, mechanisms and arrangements to manage the ICT risk which it may pose to financial entities and the Lead Overseer has the power to conduct inspections and investigations, and issue recommendations in relation to the provider's management of ICT risk

DORA – Responsibilities of Directors

Article 5 DORA imposes the following obligations on financial entities:

- Financial entities must have an internal governance and control framework that ensures an effective and prudent management of ICT risk.
- The ‘management body’ must define, approve, oversee and be responsible for the implementation of all arrangements related to the ICT risk management framework. Article 5(2)(a) then expressly provides that the management body bears ‘the ultimate responsibility for managing the financial entity's ICT risk’.
- Members of the management body must actively keep up to date with sufficient knowledge and skills to understand and assess ICT risk and its impact on the operations of the financial entity, including by following specific training on a regular basis, commensurate to the ICT risk being managed.

Article 5 does not apply to critical ICT service providers.

DORA – Liabilities of Directors

The Oversight Framework does **not** contain provisions imposing personal liability on Directors or management bodies of critical ICT third-party service providers.

As mentioned above, the primary focus of the Oversight Framework is to ensure the provider implements comprehensive, sound and effective rules, procedures, mechanisms and arrangements to manage the ICT risk which it may pose to financial entities and the Lead Overseer has the power to conduct inspections and investigations, and issue recommendations in relation to the provider's management of ICT risk.

**Suspension of Services:** Financial entities may be directed to temporarily suspend the use of services provided by a non-compliant critical ICT third-party service provider or to terminate relevant contractual arrangements.

**Public Disclosure:** In certain circumstances, the Lead Overseer may publicize non-compliance by a critical ICT third-party service provider.

<sup>20</sup> Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011

<sup>21</sup> Directive (EU) 2022/2556 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU, 2014/65/EU, (EU) 2015/2366 and (EU) 2016/2341 as regards digital operational resilience for the financial sector

<sup>22</sup> The final assessment and designation of critical ICT third-party service providers is ongoing and will be complete by the end of 2025.

<sup>23</sup> The relevant Lead Overseer will be one of the three European Supervisory Authorities, i.e. the European

Banking Authority (“**EBA**”), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (“**EIOPA**”) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (“**ESMA**”).

<sup>24</sup> DORA, Article 31(1).

## Read more about CER

The CER Directive targets 'critical entities' that provide essential services in sectors such as energy, drinking water, transport, digital infrastructure, food, healthcare, financial market infrastructure, wastewater, government, banking and aerospace. In addition to the cyber security requirements under NIS2, 'critical entities' are also subject to requirements to ensure their physical resilience, for example against sabotage.

On 25 October 2024, the CER Directive was transposed into Irish law by the European Union (Resilience of Critical Entities) Regulations 2024 (S.I. No. 559/2024). The ministries responsible for the critical sectors determine which organisations they designate as critical entities. Organisations therefore do not have to make this determination themselves. Competent authorities must decide which entities they supervise as critical entities within 21 months of the entry into force of the Regulations, and those entities will be notified of their designation within one month of identification being made by a competent authority.

A National Strategy on the Resilience of Critical Entities will be developed to provide a comprehensive framework for enhancing the resilience of these entities. This strategy will include risk assessments, identification of critical entities, and measures to improve their resilience.

The requirements under the CER Directive / the above regulations are not discussed further here.

## Read more about CRA

The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) is a European Regulation that sets binding requirements for the cyber security of 'all products with digital elements' (including all hardware, software and IoT devices). This ensures that consumers and businesses can safely use digital products, such as webcams and smart TVs that form part of the Internet of Things (IoT).

The law requires companies to treat cyber security not as an afterthought but as a core part of their product development. A transition period has been introduced, ending on 11 December 2027, allowing products and processes to be adjusted to meet the new requirements. The transition period for the mandatory reporting of cyber security incidents ends earlier, on 11 September 2026.

The requirements under the CRA are not discussed further here.

